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In early December 1994, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and many private economists were pre-
dicting that Mexico’s real gross domestic product
(GDP) would grow by at least 3.8 percent in
1995.1 Mexico appeared to be on the fast track to
economic growth and stability. For the first time
in many years, its annual inflation rate was down
to less than 10 percent, the public-sector budget
was nearly balanced, and exports were growing
at an annual rate in excess of 22 percent. More-
over, Mexico’s entry into the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its recent un-
eventful presidential elections suggested a conti-
nuity in the country’s economic reform policies.
A few weeks later, however, on December
20, 1994, international financial markets were
rocked by the devaluation of the Mexican peso.
Then, what first appeared to be a minor correction
in Mexico’s nominal exchange rate quickly devel-
oped into a broader financial crunch felt in and
outside Mexico. By March 1995, the peso had
fallen more than 50 percent against the dollar, and
monthly inflation was growing at an annual rate
in excess of 60 percent. Despite a $50 billion finan-
cial assistance package arranged in late January
by the international community to help shore-up
liquidity problems in Mexican dollar-denomi-
nated debt, interest rates on this debt remained
twice as high as they were before the devalua-
tion. The Mexican government now expects the
country’s real GDP to fall about 3 percent in 1995.
It may take several years for Mexico to fully
regain the investor confidence lost during this
recent economic crisis. However, the speed with
which Mexico recovers will be fundamentally
determined by the economic policies it chooses
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It may take several years for
Mexico to fully regain the
investor confidence lost during
this recent economic crisis.
However, the speed with which
Mexico recovers will be funda-
mentally determined by the
economic policies it chooses to
follow. The more Mexico relies on
open markets and stable macro-
economic policies, and the less it
withdraws within itself, the faster
the country will recover.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 3 ECONOMIC REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1995
to follow. The more Mexico relies on open mar-
kets and stable macroeconomic policies, and the
less it withdraws within itself, the faster the
country will recover.
The purpose of this article is to put Mexico’s
most recent economic crisis into broad historical
context in order to assess the future trend in
Mexico’s economic policies. Like many develop-
ing countries during the 1980s, Mexico’s eco-
nomic paradigm shifted from a closed market,
inward-looking development strategy to an open
market, outward-oriented development strategy.
Unlike the period leading up to the 1982 debt
crisis, the period before the latest crisis was one
in which markets were becoming more open,
inflation was low, and the public-sector budget
was nearly balanced. Although there are forces in
Mexico pulling away from market reforms as well
as toward them, the trend in Mexico’s policies has
been toward greater openness. These economic
reform policies have made future openness a
more credible policy.
The first section of this article examines the
history leading up to Mexico’s recent econo-
mic policies. Next, the article discusses Mexico’s
economic reform policies and how they have
changed since the economic crisis began. The
following section examines the factors that influ-
ence the credibility of Mexico’s open market
policies. The final section summarizes the likely
trend in Mexico’s policies.
The historical context
The years of inward orientation. The eco-
nomic reform policies that Mexico undertook in
the mid-1980s were a shift away from policies that
began shortly after World War II. Like many
developing countries in the early 1950s, Mexico
pursued an import-substitution industrialization
policy.2 The government kept Mexican markets
relatively closed to foreign competition, restricted
foreign direct investment, and tightly regulated
domestic financial markets.
The original impetus for closed market
policies was the dependency theory, the idea that
if poor countries want to grow, they have to break
away from developed countries. Poor countries
would have to start producing manufactured
goods for themselves rather than continue to
import these goods from developed countries in
exchange for exports of primary goods. The fear
was that poor countries would never catch up to
the rich countries without major government
intervention to manage international competition
and support domestic industry.3
Despite the inherent problems of a closed,
highly regulated economy, Mexico’s real GDP
Figure 2
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ing countries that followed more outward-
oriented policies, such as Korea and Taiwan, but
growth was stable and living standards were
rising.4 This period of Mexico’s development
has been referred to as stabilizing development.
During the early 1970s, Mexico’s inward-
looking policies generated economic inefficien-
cies, but increased government spending during
the period may have made these costs less
apparent.5 While per capita real GDP grew 3.7
percent from 1954 to 1972, it grew only slightly
less, 3.1 percent, from 1973 to 1976. The micro-
economic costs of price controls, a growing
government sector, and inward-based industrial-
ization policies were beginning to increase
(Bazdresch and Levy 1991). Moreover, resources
that might have otherwise been devoted to edu-
cation and other productive investments were
spent on subsidizing a growing number of the
state-owned enterprises.6 The world recession
and the spike in oil prices that hit in 1973 only
made matters worse for Mexico, which at the time
was a net importer of oil (Lustig 1992).
In attempting to offset a slowdown in growth,
Mexico pursed expansionary fiscal and monetary
policies. However, as Table 1 and Figure 2 show,4
expansionary policies without real fundamental
economic change simply generated inflation and
large fiscal and current account deficits. In 1976,
a balance of payments crisis erupted and led to a
60-percent devaluation in the peso, which had
been fixed at 12.50 old pesos per dollar since 1954
(Table 2).
If macroeconomic policies had been as
stable as they were in the 1950s and 1960s, Mexico
might have been able to avoid the balance of
payments crisis in 1976, even without structural
change. But Mexico’s increasing economic ineffi-
ciencies would have necessitated, at some point,
fundamental change.
Table 2
Overview of Mexican Finances, 1954–94
Real GDP
Real GDP per capita Nominal International
Population per capita growth rate Inflation exchange rate reserves minus gold
Year (In thousands) (In U.S. dollars) (Percent) (Percent) (New pesos) (Millions of U.S. dollars)
1954 31,419 2,397 7.15 4.85 .0125 147.08
1955 32,348 2,514 4.88 15.99 .0125 298.50
1956 33,483 2,590 3.02 4.85 .0125 344.50
1957 34,617 2,711 4.67 5.10 .0125 295.50
1958 35,757 2,751 1.48 8.17 .0125 247.50
1959 36,891 2,726 –.91 0 .0125 316.00
1960 38,227 2,836 4.04 7.59 .0125 306.00
1961 39,472 2,864 .99 –2.03 .0125 301.00
1962 40,754 2,897 1.15 2.15 .0125 333.00
1963 42,074 3,019 4.21 –.11 .0125 409.00
1964 43,446 3,258 7.92 3.55 .0125 418.00
1965 44,337 3,351 2.85 4.50 .0125 379.50
1966 46,337 3,467 3.46 3.77 .0125 454.99
1967 47,868 3,582 3.32 3.05 .0125 420.00
1968 49,451 3,766 5.14 1.76 .0125 491.92
1969 51,081 3,846 2.12 2.60 .0125 493.39
1970 52,770 3,987 3.67 7.06 .0125 568.10
1971 51,982 4,213 5.67 4.95 .0125 752.09
1972 53,690 4,404 4.53 5.66 .0125 975.88
1973 55,429 4,609 4.65 21.35 .0125 1,160.21
1974 57,165 4,782 3.75 20.60 .0125 1,237.63
1975 58,876 4,928 3.05 11.31 .0125 1,383.46
1976 60,560 4,973 .91 27.20 .0200 1,188.00
1977 62,211 4,900 –1.47 20.67 .0227 1,648.90
1978 63,836 5,208 6.29 16.17 .0227 1,841.51
1979 65,445 5,621 7.93 20.04 .0228 2,071.71
1980 67,046 6,054 7.70 29.78 .0233 2,959.89
1981 68,637 6,467 6.82 28.68 .0262 4,074.36
1982 70,225 5,942 –8.12 98.87 .0965 833.89
1983 71,791 5,401 –9.10 80.77 .1439 3,912.92
1984 73,309 5,524 2.28 59.17 .1926 7,272.04
1985 74,766 5,621 1.76 63.74 .3717 4,906.40
1986 76,178 5,283 –6.01 105.75 .9235 5,669.82
1987 77,562 5,262 –.40 159.16 2.2097 12,464.08
1988 78,933 5,349 1.65 51.66 2.2810 5,278.68
1989 80,312 5,566 4.06 19.70 2.6410 6,329.10
1990 81,724 5,827 4.69 29.93 2.9454 9,862.90
1991 83,306 6,018 3.28 18.80 3.0710 17,725.52
1992 84,967 6,253 3.90 11.94 3.1154 18,941.96
1993 86,557 6,167 –1.38 8.01 3.1059 25,109.61
1994* 88,054 6,244 1.25 7.00 5.0800 6,148.00
*Estimate.
NOTE: Data are for the end of the period. Real GDP is shown in terms of 1985 U.S. dollars and is adjusted for differences in purchasing power
(using an equivalent basket of goods) between the United States and Mexico.
SOURCES: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics; Penn World Table, Version 5.6, 1995; Banco de México.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 5 ECONOMIC REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1995
Mexico was ready for structural change in
1976, but huge oil discoveries appeared to lift
fiscal and foreign exchange constraints, at least
for the foreseeable future. Rather than implement
the needed but difficult structural reforms, the
new administration of President José López Por-
tillo, expecting uninterrupted oil revenues, set out
on a massive fiscal expansion. Without tight
budgetary constraints, the state devoted more and
more resources to purchasing private-sector firms
that were no longer economically viable, with the
hope of maintaining employment (Bazdresch
and Levy 1991, 249). From 1950 to 1970, the
number of para-statal firms in Mexico remained
below 300; twelve years later, state-owned firms
numbered 1,155. In 1983, state-owned firms
accounted for 18.5 percent of GDP and employed
more than 10 percent of the population (Aspe
1993, 181). Firms owned by the government
included businesses such as the national oil
company (PEMEX), the airlines (Aeromexico and
Mexicana), the national telephone company
(TELMEX), sugar refineries, and hotels.
Mexico’s economic boom turn to bust when
oil prices began to fall and U.S. real interest rates
began to rise in mid-1981. The fixed exchange rate
became extremely overvalued as the economic
fundamentals changed. Investors’ fear of another
balance of payments crisis and devaluation led to
capital flight. The government tried to maintain
the exchange rate as long as it could, but foreign
reserves were dwindling rapidly. In 1982, the
government devalued the currency by more than
260 percent, declared a temporary moratorium on
debt payments, and forced the conversion of
dollar-denominated bank deposits into pesos at
an unfavorable, below-market exchange rate.
As the crisis worsened, the government
responded by tightening its grip on the economy.
Toward late 1982, all trade became regulated, full
exchange controls on capital were adopted, and
the Mexican banking system was nationalized.
But more government intervention spooked the
financial markets and only made matters worse.
With the Mexican financial markets in disarray, a
government fiscal crisis, and inflation pushing an
annual rate of 100 percent, real per capita GDP de-
clined 8.1 percent in 1982 and 9.1 percent in 1983.
Hindsight is always better than foresight. By
1982, it was obvious that Mexico should have
pursued more market-based policies and limited
foreign borrowing. However, with the price of
oil increasing quite rapidly during the late 1970s,
and expectations of further price increases (ex-
pectations that other countries shared as well),
the pressing need for change was not apparent
(Lustig 1992, 21).
The transition years. In late 1982, Mexico’s
newly elected president, Miguel De la Madrid
Hurtado, inherited perhaps the worst economic
crisis in the country’s history. During the early
years of De la Madrid’s administration, the first
important stages of reform began, but it was only
toward the end of his administration that struc-
tural reform policies genuinely moved in the
direction of a more market-based economy.
From 1982 to 1985, Mexico’s annual rate
of inflation slowed from around 100 percent
to about 65 percent in response to govern-
ment spending cuts and tighter monetary policy.
Real GDP per capita declined about 13 per-
cent over these years as the economy adjusted to
lower government spending and large foreign
debt payments. Due to the high debt payments,
Mexico’s net transfers to the rest of the world
totaled nearly 6 percent of GDP from 1982 to 1985
(Aspe 1993, 35).
Although the De la Madrid administration
began reducing the public-sector deficit, it was
not eliminating other fundamental causes of
macroeconomic instability. Anti-inflation policies
were not credible because the government still
relied heavily on excessive money growth to earn
inflation tax revenues. The inflation tax as a share
of GDP was 8 percent in 1983 and 5.5 percent
in 1985 (Figure 3).7 The need for inflation tax
revenues was due to debt payments, financial
support of state-owned enterprises, and a weak
tax system. Inflation began to accelerate in 1985,
and by 1986, it was back up to more than 100
percent a year.
Although the economy was opening to
trade, it was still relatively closed and the private
sector was uncertain about the government’s true
Figure 3
Mexico’s Inflation Rate and
Inflation Tax, 1982–94
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SOURCE OF PRIMARY DATA: International Monetary Fund.6
commitment to open markets. Thirty-five percent
of imports had to be licensed, and quotas covered
83 percent of the value of imports (Aspe 1993,
156). The export sector was being held back be-
cause resources were kept in import-competing
sectors. Foreign investment was also weak be-
cause investors were suspicious of Mexico’s com-
mitment to open markets; laws still limited foreign
ownership of business, and the government con-
trolled the banking sector. The macroeconomic
environment continued to worsen. After an earth-
quake in 1985, another oil shock in 1986, and a
stock market crash in 1987, Mexico was ready for
rapid and far-reaching reforms. The next package
of reforms began to address some of Mexico’s
worst structural problems.
The move to open market-based policies
During the early 1980s, Mexico’s drop in
real per capita income was almost as large as that
which occurred during the Great Depression. As
Figure 4 shows, in 1982 real per capita GDP fell
8.1 percent, while inflation rose to an annual rate
of 98.9 percent. The experience convinced many
people in and outside the government that Mexi-
can policies were not working and they had to
find an alternative (Aspe 1993, 14). Certainly,
there were those, mainly in the protected and
state-owned sectors, who resisted changes in
policy. But as the economy continued to contract,
their political clout waned. The country em-
barked on a new policy direction.
In December 1987, President De la Madrid
and representatives of the labor, farming, and
business sectors signed the Pact for Economic
Solidarity, which was followed by the Pact for
Stability and Economic Growth under the newly
elected administration of President Salinas de
Gortari. These two measures, now jointly referred
to as the Pacto, were designed to combine
orthodox fiscal and monetary restraint with struc-
tural reforms and an incomes policy (controls on
wages and prices).
The Pacto has gone through 15 phases (or
renegotiations, as they have been called) since its
implementation in 1987.8 The Pacto phases began
as very short-term commitments, lasting about
two months; they then grew to longer term, one-
year commitments.9 During the first phases, a
strong emphasis was placed on price and wage
controls, fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment,
and debt renegotiation; later stages focused on
deregulation and privatization to promote eco-
nomic efficiency and on trade and financial liber-
alization to enhance competition and reduce
production costs (Schwartz 1994).
Incomes policy. The incomes policy, or
price and wage controls, has been and remains
the most controversial part of the Pacto. Wage
controls included programs that simply limited
nominal wage increases, as well as more compli-
cated schemes of linking nominal wage increases
to productivity growth. Price controls were not
uniform across the economy; the intention was
to focus the controls on the leading sectors. Some
have contended that the incomes policy was
necessary to break the cycle of increasing infla-
tion resulting from the practice of indexing
wages and prices to past inflation (Lustig 1992,
52). Others, however, have argued that the in-
comes policy was unnecessary because, without
fiscal and monetary austerity, the lifting of price
controls would simply result in a return to high
inflation.
Fiscal and monetary austerity are sufficient
to stop inflation, but some have claimed that a
benefit of the incomes policy was that it served to
announce the government’s intentions to all con-
cerned parties. An explicit statement of the
government’s goals may have informed individu-
als what the inflation targets were, which could
have decreased the costs of adjustment. However,
price and wage controls, by themselves, can be
costly because they tend to distort relative prices
in an economy. The exact cost or benefit of
Mexico’s incomes policy has yet to be quantified.
The incomes policy was the most hotly
debated during the first few months of the Pacto,
when prices and wages were adjusted on a
monthly basis according to changes in expected
inflation. As inflation subsided, price and wage
controls became a less contentious policy. High
Figure 4
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inflation expectations were no longer automati-
cally built into wage contracts, and the strength of
labor unions to negotiate large wage increases
declined. Although the December 1994 exchange
rate devaluation was followed by higher inflation
and attempts to impose more stringent price and
wage controls, the government subsequently
abandoned further attempts to impose controls.10
Public finance. An important element of the
Pacto has been public finance policy. In addition
to fiscal austerity, there has been a realignment of
public-sector goods prices to reflect costs, the
divestiture of state-run enterprises, and changes
in the tax structure. An often observed difficulty
with plans to reduce fiscal deficits, not just in
Mexico but also in other countries undergoing
economic reforms, is their structural inconsis-
tency with other objectives. In other words, a
government may state that the fiscal budget will
be balanced and inflation will be reduced, but
without a functioning tax system, inflation may be
the only way to finance public expenditure.
Although Mexico still has fiscal problems, changes
in the public sector have made fiscal prudence a
more feasible policy than during the early 1980s.
Of the 1,155 enterprises held by the public
sector in 1982, 940 were either sold to the private
sector, liquidated, or merged by 1994. State-
owned enterprise expenditures fell from around
18 percent of GDP in 1983 to 9.6 percent of GDP
in 1994. The recent economic stabilization plan
for Mexico calls for further privatization of ports,
public utilities, and some petrochemical plants.
However, some of these proposed privatizations
are being contested, and PEMEX, the national oil
company and the largest state-run business, is not
currently being considered for privatization.
Since 1989, the tax system has been simpli-
fied, and tax rates are down to levels similar to
those in the United States. The corporate tax rate
was reduced from 42 percent to 35 percent, and
the highest income tax rate paid by individuals fell
from 50 percent to 35 percent. By simplifying the
tax structure, lowering tax rates, and increas-
ing enforcement, tax evasion has fallen and tax
revenue has increased. In the early 1990s, tax
revenues increased nearly 30 percent, mostly as a
result of Mexico’s expanding tax base (Aspe 1993,
108). The overall fiscal deficit as a percentage of
GDP fell from 16 percent in 1987 to 0.3 percent
in 1994.11 During the same period, total govern-
ment spending fell from 43.7 percent of GDP to
26.3 percent of GDP, and inflation fell from 160
percent a year to 7 percent a year.
Mexico’s stabilization plan of March 9, 1995,
calls for increases in the prices of fuel, electricity,
natural gas, and other goods and services pro-
vided by the public sector to reflect international
prices and increase revenues. There are also plans
to raise the value-added tax from 10 to 15 percent,
reduce public-sector employment, and limit the
growth of public-sector real wages.
Financial liberalization. An important ele-
ment of Mexico’s new reform policies has been
financial liberalization. Financial liberalization took
a major step forward after 1988 with the elimina-
tion of compulsory bank reserve requirements
and forced credit to public-sector enterprises. The
elimination of these measures allowed greater
financing for private-sector enterprises. Other
changes have been the authorization of universal
banking and other financial entities. In 1991–92,
the government privatized all the banks and lifted
capital controls imposed after the 1982 crisis.
Mexico is now increasing access to foreign
banks and brokerage houses. In October 1994,
Mexico authorized virtually all the foreign
banks, brokerages, and insurance companies
that sought entry into the market. The finance
ministry issued fifty-two licenses to eighteen
commercial banks, sixteen securities firms, twelve
insurance companies, five financial groups, and
a leasing company.
Because of the recent economic crisis and
stress on the banking system, the government has
pledged to speed up implementation of provi-
sions that would allow greater foreign ownership
of existing financial institutions. Foreigners will
be able to hold majority interests in all but the
three largest banks. Before the recent economic
crisis, foreign ownership of existing banks was
severely limited, although the banking sector still
faced increased competition in the market. In
1991, Mexico’s three largest banks—Banamex,
Bancomer, and Serfin—accounted for about 62
percent of total Mexican banking assets; in late
1994, they accounted for less than 50 percent.
Since the December 1994 devaluation, there
has also been an easing of the rules keeping
financial institutions from using the futures mar-
ket to hedge uncertainty. Prior to the devaluation,
the development of a futures market to hedge
peso and equity volatility was suppressed. But
although the government felt that these markets
would add to unwanted speculation against the
currency, the markets may have led to greater
flows of trade and investment. The rules now
allow for Mexican institutions to hedge move-
ments in the peso and the stock market.
Trade liberalization. On the trade side, Mexico
started to gradually liberalize in mid-1985, but the
process was solidified in 1988 when the number
of goods covered by import licenses fell dramati-
cally and the tariff structure was simplified. In8
1983, the share of imports covered by import
permits was close to 100 percent; by 1992, the
share had fallen to less than 2 percent (Banco de
México 1993). Mexico joined the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and
cemented its open trade stance with the United
States and Canada through NAFTA in 1993. NAFTA
has generated a large increase in trade and joint
business ventures between U.S. and Mexican
firms. For example, total trade flows between the
United States and Mexico (exports plus imports)
grew by around 17 percent in 1994, compared
with a 7-percent annual rate in 1993. These trade
flows have averaged about 15-percent growth
since 1988 (Figure 5). Mexico is now vying with
Japan to be our second largest trading partner
behind Canada.
Monetary and exchange rate policy. When
Mexico began its economic reform, the key ele-
ment of its monetary policy was the use of the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor—that is,
domestic prices were tethered to international
prices by targeting the nominal exchange rate.
During the initial stages of the Pacto, the ex-
change rate was fixed to the dollar; then it was
held to a preannounced daily depreciation. In
1991, the exchange rate was allowed to float
within a widening band. At first, the top of the
band rose 20 centavos (0.0002 new pesos) per
dollar a day; then it was increased to 40 centavos
(0.0004 new pesos) per dollar a day (Figure 6 ).
On December 20, 1994, however, under pressure
from foreign exchange markets and dwindling
foreign exchange reserves, Mexico abandoned its
exchange rate band. The peso was devalued and
then allowed to float freely against the dollar.
Some have argued that keeping the ex-
change rate closely tied to the dollar, especially
during the early stages of Mexico’s economic
reforms, kept exchange rate volatility low and
allowed investors a simple means of monitoring
Mexico’s monetary policy. For example, if ex-
pected inflation was higher in Mexico than in the
United States or prospects for growth in Mexico
weakened relative to those in the United States,
dollars would leave Mexico seeking better returns
in the United States. This would lead to upward
pressure on the exchange rate (increase the
number of pesos per dollar) as people who hold
pesos buy U.S. dollars. If the exchange rate was
to be kept within the band, Mexico would need
to tighten monetary policy and increase interest
rates to attract dollars back into Mexico. As long
as the exchange rate policy was maintained and
was credible, it was argued, anyone who watched
the movement of foreign reserves would know
what would happen to monetary policy.
Of course, exchange rate policy does not
make low inflation credible. Low inflation is made
credible only through sustainable fiscal balances
and low and stable monetary growth. Over the
long run, it is these policies that keep exchange
rate policy credible, not the other way around. If
monetary policy is too loose and is inconsistent
with maintaining the exchange rate, foreign re-
serves leave the country. Without any foreign
reserves to defend the exchange rate, the ex-
change rate policy has to be abandoned.
From 1987 to the end of 1993, Mexico’s
monetary policy was consistent with low inflation
and maintaining its exchange rate targets. Infla-
tion fell from a high of nearly 160 percent in 1987
to around 7 percent in 1994. During 1994, how-
ever, political uncertainty in Mexico and rising
Figure 5
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interest rates in the United States began to drain
Mexican foreign reserves. Investors were not
being fully compensated for the greater per-
ceived risks in the Mexican market so they took
their money elsewhere. Money left the country
because interest rates did not rise sufficiently. A
contributing factor could have also been that
peso risks were difficult to hedge against. The
central bank was suppressing the peso futures
market because it feared the market would
allow for inordinate speculation against the cur-
rency. Foreign reserves fell from around $25
billion at the end of 1993 to about $16 billion in
July 1994 (Figure 7).
The election of Ernesto Zedillo in August
1994 brought new confidence in Mexico’s poli-
cies and temporarily boosted foreign reserves
and the peso. Following the elections, how-
ever, because of higher U.S. interest rates and
increased investor uncertainty, money began
flowing out of Mexico again. Without dramati-
cally higher interest rates, foreign reserves con-
tinued to leave the country. Eventually, foreign
reserves dwindled to such a point that the ex-
change rate band had to be loosened and then
completely abandoned after continued pressure
on the peso.
If interest rates had been kept higher after
the 1994 presidential elections, perhaps the costs
of abandoning the exchange rate, in terms of lost
credibility and higher short-run inflation, could
have been avoided. In hindsight, this may have
been a better option than the one chosen, al-
though dramatically higher interest rates could
have also sparked an economic crisis. Perhaps a
better option would have been to let the ex-
change rate float when foreign reserves were
coming into the country, such as in late 1993.
A floating exchange rate allows a country to
weather domestic and international economic
shocks without necessitating dramatic changes
in domestic monetary policy and without calling
into question the credibility of basic policies.
Now that Mexico is floating its exchange rate,
economic ups and downs will not generate specu-
lation against a particular exchange rate policy.
If monetary restraint continues, inflation—over
the long run—will remain moderate.
Assessing Mexico’s policy credibility
What determines credibility. Perhaps eco-
nomic liberalization never comes without a crisis.
This has certainly been the case in Mexico. What
becomes evident from looking across a broad
spectrum of countries that have embarked on
economic reform is that some have achieved great
success, while others have failed miserably.12
For example, Peru’s trade liberalization attempt
during the early 1980s was abandoned shortly
after it was implemented. Will Mexico’s economic
reforms continue?
A common element of unsuccessful liberal-
izations seems to be the failure to create a credible
economic policy. An example would be a
government’s pursuit of low inflation without
addressing far-reaching structural problems, such
as an inadequate tax system and a large budget
deficit. In this case, pursuit of low inflation is
inconsistent with the budget deficit and an inabil-
ity to tax except through inflation.
Another credibility problem occurs when a
government’s policies are time-inconsistent. A
time-inconsistent policy is one in which the
government, at some later date, has an incentive
to break it’s promise. For example, the govern-
ment, for political reasons, may have an incentive
to redistribute income from the rich to the poor.13
Under this objective, a free trade policy may not
be credible because the government has an
incentive to provide more protection than ex-
pected to import-competing firms whenever the
relative price of imports decreases. When the
price of imports falls, the import-competing sec-
tor becomes relatively poor; consequently, the
government has an incentive to renege on its free
trade promise and redistribute income through
protection to these sectors. Free trade, then, is not
a credible policy because the private sector un-
derstands the government incentive structure.
Creating a credible policy that is time-
consistent can be problematic because it depends
on the government’s ability to precommit to a
particular policy. In trade reform, for example, if
a government cannot precommit to free trade, it
may have to pursue a time-consistent but second-
Figure 7
Mexico’s Stock of International
Reserves Less Gold, 1994
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best policy of partial tariff protection. In other
words, the government may never be able to
create a credible policy committed to complete
free trade; it may, however, be able to create a
credible policy with less protection.
Consequently, to evaluate the credibility of
any particular economic policy two questions
have to be addressed: (1) Is the policy consistent
with other objectives being pursued at the same
time? and (2) Is the policy time-consistent? In
other words, does the government have an in-
centive to renege on the policy commitment? In
the political economy context, the second ques-
tion can be thought of addressing whether the
political forces that determine a particular policy
are likely to change.
Almost universally, no policy—whether in
a developed country like the United States or
developing country like Mexico—is completely
credible. The lack of information about the
government’s incentives and uncertainty about
future economic shocks makes complete credi-
bility impossible. However, the degree of policy
credibility can be subjectively assessed by exam-
ining factors such as the government’s behavior
over time, the country’s institutions, and the
consistency of policies.
Assessing the credibility of Mexico’s eco-
nomic liberalization. Since the December 1994
devaluation, Mexico’s economic growth has stalled,
and a growing number of people have become
disenchanted with the current economic situa-
tion.14 High interest rates have made it difficult
for people to service their debts and have caused
a decline in spending. While the economic crisis
could generate a political stimulus for greater
economic liberalization and macroeconomic
stability, it could also cause the abandonment of
policies that enhance long-run growth in order
to ease the short-run pains of adjustment. So far,
the policies that have been adopted since the
crisis began have favored greater economic
liberalization and long-run macroeconomic sta-
bility, but their credibility over time will be
determined by their consistency with other objec-
tives and the strength of the constituency groups
that favor such policies.
Because of Mexico’s recent exchange rate
devaluation, the credibility of another fixed ex-
change rate policy in Mexico is obviously very
low. Mexico’s past monetary policy, although it
generated a relatively low rate of inflation, was
not consistent with its rigid exchange rate band.
Its current floating exchange rate regime, how-
ever, is more credible because it does not require
any specific commitment to tie Mexico’s mone-
tary policy to that of the United States. In addition,
while a floating exchange rate may be more
volatile on a day-to-day basis, it is unlikely to
experience the kind of large discrete jump that is
often seen in managed exchange rate regimes.
Compared with the period after the 1982
crisis and devaluation, however, Mexico may
have a more credible low inflation policy. Al-
though inflation has dramatically increased since
the December 1994 devaluation, over the longer
run Mexico may be in a better position to avoid
high inflation. Unlike the situation during the
1982 economic crisis, the Mexican economy
now has fewer government-owned enterprises
that are taking funds from the public sector; many
of these businesses have been privatized or
liquidated. Moreover, the government budget is
not in a large deficit, and because of a better
tax system, the government does not have to rely
solely on the inflation tax (printing money to pay
for government expenses) to collect revenues
(Figures 3 and 8).
Government incentives to maintain a more
stable macroeconomic environment may also be
higher today than in the past. Unlike the early
1980s, economic interdependence is much more
important in Mexico today. Trade as a share of
GDP increased from 8.7 percent in 1982 to 22.1
percent in 1993. The benefits of foreign invest-
ment and its sensitivity to bad policy choices have
also become more obvious over the last decade.
Countries that are more open and outward
oriented—such as Chile, Hong Kong, Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan—have achieved much
higher sustained economic growth than more
closed, inward-oriented economies.15
Figure 8
Mexico’s Inflation Rate and
Fiscal Deficit, 1987–94
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The importance of market-based policies is
apparent in Mexico’s own experience. As dis-
cussed earlier, import-substitution industrializa-
tion policies were very costly for Mexico in terms
of diminished economic efficiency and long-run
growth. Moreover, while Mexico’s 1982 crisis
certainly hurt the country terribly, the poor policy
response afterward, such as the nationalization of
the banking industry, turned a bad situation
worse by creating a massive capital flight for
which Mexico paid a tremendous price. Despite
the recent exchange rate crisis, Mexico has yet to
reverse its open market stance.
Institutional arrangements can also in-
crease the credibility of a policy. Although
Mexico unilaterally reduced trade barriers in
several areas before joining NAFTA and GATT,
these multilateral agreements may be a much
stronger commitment to future open markets,
and not just because they are international
agreements.
Free trade agreements create domestic
coalitions against increases in domestic protec-
tion because of the threat of retaliatory re-
sponse and possible collapse of the entire
agreement. The greater the move to free trade,
the more at stake and the greater the strength
of these free trade coalitions. Usually, it does
not pay for any one group to lobby against a
single protective policy if the costs of such a
policy to that group are relatively small. How-
ever, with NAFTA, a Mexican exporter has
much more of an incentive to lobby actively
against increases in Mexican protection be-
cause an increase in protection could induce a
retaliatory response against its own products
from the United States or Canada. The Mexican
consumer also has a stake in seeing that the
free trade agreement is kept because of the
potentially large increase in the price of con-
sumer goods if NAFTA is abandoned.16
Even though there may be coalitions in
favor of sustaining open markets, in some sectors
there is likely to be backsliding. Like the United
States, Mexico is now using antidumping and
countervailing duties against imports much more
than in the past. Despite the fact that average tariff
rates fell from around 34 percent in 1985 to 4
percent in 1992, the coverage of nontariff barriers
went from 12.7 percent of imports in 1985–87 to
20 percent of imports in 1991–92 (Edwards 1993).
The devaluation of the peso, however, may
weaken the demand for nontariff barriers in
Mexico. As the real value of the peso (adjusted
for Mexican and U.S. inflation rates) has fallen
against the dollar, the price pressure on import-
competing firms in Mexico has decreased.
Conclusion
While continued economic reforms are
not guaranteed in Mexico, they are more likely
than is often believed. During the 1980s, Mexi-
co’s economic paradigm shifted from a closed
market, inward-looking development strategy
to an open market, outward-oriented develop-
ment strategy. Unlike the period prior to Mexico’s
1982 debt crisis, the trend in Mexico’s economic
policies has been toward greater economic inte-
gration in the world economy and a reduced
reliance on the government sector. This trend
in Mexico’s policies, although not immune to
shocks, is more consistent with future low in-
flation and greater economic growth than the
country’s previous inward-oriented policies.
Notes
Catherine Mansell Carstens, Ken Emery, Steve Kamin,
Moisés Schwartz, Sidney Weintraub, and Carlos
Zarazaga offered many helpful comments for this
article. All remaining errors are solely my responsibility.
1 In December 1994, the Blue Chip consensus forecast
for 1995 Mexican real GDP growth was 3.8 percent.
The OECD was predicting 4-percent growth for 1995
and 4.3-percent growth for 1996.
2 One of the main architects of this policy was Raúl
Prebisch. For an insightful analysis of Prebisch’s views,
see Love (1980).
3 The underpinnings of this theory was the idea that as
world income rose, the demand for manufactured
products would increase relative to primary products,
and this change would lead to a lower relative price for
primary products in international markets. As a result,
if developing countries did nothing to change the
structure of their output, their terms of trade would
always move against them.
4 Over the same period, Taiwan and Korea both experi-
enced around 4.6-percent real GDP growth per capita.
5 Although Prebisch was one of the main architects of
the import-substitution industrialization policy, he
realized the problems of protectionism as early as
1963. Hirschman (1968) quotes a very interesting
passage from Prebisch (1963, 71): “As is well known,
the proliferation of industries of every kind in a closed
market has deprived the Latin American countries of
the advantages of specialization and economies of
scale, and owing to the protection afforded by exces-
sive tariff duties and restrictions, a healthy form of
internal competition has failed to develop, to the
detriment of efficient production.”
6 Gil Díaz (1984). As price controls were imposed to limit
inflation, the profit margins of some private firms were
squeezed. Those firms that could no longer produce
profitably at the given prices were then purchased by
the government. This was the case, for example, with
sugar mills.12
7 The real output that a government obtains by printing
money and spending it is called the inflation tax or
seigniorage. Money creation that leads to inflation
erodes the real value of nominal money holdings. The
formula used here to calculate the inflation tax as a
share of GDP is: INFTAX = (M/GDP) * π/(π + 1), where
M is monetary base, GDP is nominal gross domestic
product, and π is the annual inflation rate.
8 If one includes the two stabilization plans announced
on January 2, 1995, and March 9, 1995, as new Pacto
phases, then there have been seventeen phases.
9 See Schwartz (1994) for the dates of Pacto announce-
ments and phase durations.
10 The Mexican government’s first stabilization plan,
announced on January 2, 1995, allowed for a 7-percent
increase in overall wages. On March 9, a revised plan
included an additional 10-percent increase in the
minimum wage, but those earning more than the
minimum wage were free to negotiate their own wages.
11 The overall fiscal balance referred to here is the
public-sector borrowing requirement, which measures
the difference between total revenue and expenditure,
which includes debt amortization in the interest
component. The primary balance, which excludes all
of the interest component in expenditures, has been
in surplus since 1985.
12 See Michaely, Papageorgiou, and Choksi (1991) for an
overview of the liberalization experience in several
developing countries.
13 This is a case analyzed by Staiger and Tabellini
(1987). In formal economic terms, the government’s
objective is to redistribute income from individuals with
a low marginal utility of income to those with a high
marginal utility of income.
14 Recent election results suggest such disenchantment.
For the first time in its sixty-five year history, the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost the governor-
ship in the state of Jalisco, which includes Mexico’s
second largest city, Guadalajara. The victory went to
the National Action Party (PAN), which received 55
percent of the vote.
15 See Gould and Ruffin (forthcoming).
16 See Gould (1992) for a more in-depth discussion of
this topic.
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